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Abstract 
 
China’s capital account convertibility is presently not well understood. A relatively closed de 
jure regime sits in contrast with a de facto regime that exhibits distinct signs of being quite 
open. This paper seeks to shed light on this issue by using an econometric model to predict 
the level of capital flows that would be expected if China had a fully open capital account. 
The results show that over 2001-2003, observed capital flows were around 85 percent of the 
predicted value, suggesting that China’s capital account over a one year time horizon is 
already quite open. Short run convertibility would expectedly be less than this figure. Thus, 
the results carry the connotation that the cost of capital controls in terms of allocative 
inefficiency over the medium and long run is likely to have been modest while some 
unwarranted short run volatility has been avoided. Nonetheless, the results do not leave room 
for policy complacency. As China continues to implement its WTO commitments in addition 
to other arrangements such as the Common Economic Partnership Agreement with Hong 
Kong, short run convertibility is presently on the rise. This makes implementing policies that 
are prerequisites for full convertibility a matter of urgency. 
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1. Introduction 
A key economic variable in China that is currently not well understood is the degree to which 
its capital account is convertible. Capital account convertibility refers to the freedom that 
private agents have in converting local financial assets into foreign financial assets and vice 
versa at market determined rates of exchange. On the one hand, it is known that China 
employs a complex system of capital controls. Based on classifications of capital account 
restrictiveness published by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) with respect to its 
member countries, China emerges as having one of the most closed regimes in the world. On 
the other hand, the view that capital account convertibility remains low appears incongruent 
with China’s rising stature as both a host and source country of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) and numerous studies have pointed to non-trivial volumes of capital entering and 
leaving China through unofficial channels. During the Asian financial crisis, the evidence 
pointed to large volumes of ‘capital flight’, i.e., unofficial capital outflows (see Wu and Tang 
2000). In more recent years, speculation of an impending RMB appreciation has prompted 
sizeable inflows of ‘hot money’, much of which is not recorded in official capital flow figures 
(see, amongst others, Eichengreen 2004). These observations suggest a cleavage may exist 
between China’s de jure capital account regime, which in many ways remains closed, and its 
de facto regime, which could be largely open if official restrictions are either not enforced or 
can be easily circumvented. It cannot simply be inferred, however, that because there are 
unofficial capital flows China’s capital account is actually highly convertible, since we do not 
know what volume of capital flows would be consistent with full convertibility. Just as the 
existence of capital controls cannot be taken to imply they are necessarily effective, nor does 
some proportion of total capital entering and leaving China through unofficial channels imply 
that capital controls no longer exert any substantial impact.  The aim of this paper is to make 
a contribution toward finding out just how open China’s capital account is.  
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Pinning down the degree of capital account convertibility is important for several reasons. 
First and most topically, it has implications for China’s exchange rate policy. Since 1994 
China has maintained a fixed exchange rate peg that appears to have served the country well 
with rapid economic growth being accompanied by macroeconomic stability. Yet the 
consensus now is that the de facto degree of capital account convertibility makes the peg 
increasingly costly to maintain and should be abandoned (see, amongst others, Goldstein and 
Lardy 2003; Roberst and Tyers 2003; Eichengreen 2004). This proposition is rooted in the 
'irreconcilable trilemma' of international macroeconomics, which states that in an 
environment of highly mobile capital, maintaining a fixed exchange rate can result in large 
and destabilising fluctuations in the domestic money supply as the monetary authorities are 
forced to buy and sell the domestic currency at the fixed rate. In recent years the combination 
of a dollar peg and hot money inflows is said to have exposed China to inflationary risks as 
the domestic money supply rapidly expanded.  However, the case for abandoning the peg is 
not as clear cut as many would like to suggest as while inflation did accelerate during 2004, 
the latest data point to a soft landing in 2005,1 and money supply growth had also returned to 
the target range set by the monetary authorities.2  
 
Secondly, the current degree of capital account openness could tell us much about the 
expected impact of the financial liberalization measures mandated in China’s WTO accession 
agreement. This agreement was notable for the fact that it extended well beyond merchandise 
trade in including widespread concessions in services trade, particularly financial services. 
For example, by the end of 2006 foreign banks are to be given full national treatment 
throughout China. A much stated concern is that these policies represent such dramatic 
                                                 
1 The CPI rose from –0.8 percent at the end of 2002 to 5.3 percent in July 2004 but then fell to 1.8 percent in 
April 2005. 
2 Broad money growth fell to 14.6 percent in March 2005, which was less than the ≤ 15% target. 
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changes in the degree of capital account convertibility that their introduction will inevitably 
bring financial instability. Yet this concern could be overstated if China’s capital account is 
already open in a de facto sense.   
 
Thirdly, shedding light on the degree of capital account convertibility will also be instructive 
for determining whether China offers an example of how capital controls might be used to 
promote economic stability while still connecting to the global economy more generally. 
During the Asian financial crisis it was China’s de jure regime that was routinely referred to 
as being the reason the country was able to avoid the fate suffered by its neighbours, and as 
such Yu (2000) argues that China provides a “case for capital controls”. Other authors 
however subsequently questioned this assertion as estimates of capital flight at the time 
suggested a markedly different de facto regime being in place (Laurenceson and Chai 2003).  
 
In section two of this paper, we examine the level of private capital flows and the correlation 
of these flows between China and the rest of the world in order to illustrate China’s 
increasing integration with global financial markets and to gain some initial understanding 
regarding the degree of capital account openness. In section three we outline an econometric 
model that will be used to estimate a capital flow volume consistent with an open capital 
account. In section four, we present the estimation result and compare it with observed capital 
flows in order to make an evaluation of capital account convertibility. Section five concludes. 
 
2. Private Capital Flows 
According to the IMF, private capital flows can be categorized into FDI, foreign portfolio 
investment, and other foreign investment. Here we label the latter two types of investment 
together as non-FDI (NFDI). China, as well as many other countries, has applied different 
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policies toward FDI and NFDI. FDI, while certainly still regulated, has nonetheless been 
strongly encouraged by the Chinese authorities, especially at the local level (see Chai 1998). 
On the other hand, NFDI has been tightly regulated as well as controlled. For example, 
China’s stock markets have been segmented into A and B markets, with foreigners only 
legally allowed to trade in the smaller B market. It was not until 2003 that the Qualified 
Foreign Institutional Investor scheme gave foreigners some access, albeit still very limited, to 
the much larger A market.  
 
Given the differentiated treatment of FDI and NFDI in China, it is not surprising that their 
growth paths have been divergent. Figures 1 and 2 show gross (inflows plus outflows) FDI 
flows and gross NFDI flows of China and other countries grouped by income levels, over the 
period of 1977-2003; both items are expressed as a percentage of GDP. Table 1 shows the 
correlation of these flows between China and the country groups. In this paper we focus on 
gross capital flows because it is hard to make inferences regarding the openness of the capital 
account using net figures. For example, a country that has an entirely open capital account 
with roughly equal volumes of capital inflows and outflows will only be a small capital trader 
in net terms. From Figure 1, it can be seen that China’s gross FDI surged dramatically in the 
early 1990s from 1.2 percent of GDP in 1990 to a peak of 6.6 percent in 1994. In recent 
years, it appears to have stabilized at around 4.5 percent. The level of FDI China now attracts 
is not dissimilar to the high income country average. China’s FDI flows are most closely 
correlated with low income and lower middle income countries. This is not surprising given 
that China is a part of this group and, given its sizeable GDP, is likely to dominate the group. 
A positive and significant correlation also exists with respect to upper middle and high 
income countries, but not to the same magnitude.  
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Table 1. Correlation between Gross Private Capital Flows of FDI and Non-FDI 
 
 
  
World 
(FDI) 
High 
income 
(FDI) 
Upper 
middle 
income 
(FDI) 
Lower 
middle 
income 
(FDI) 
Low 
income 
(FDI) 
China 
(FDI) 
World 
(NFDI) 
High 
income 
(NFDI) 
Upper 
middle 
income 
(NFDI) 
Lower 
middle 
income 
(NFDI) 
Low 
income 
(NFDI) 
China 
(NFDI) 
World (FDI) 1            
High income (FDI) 1.00 1           
Upper middle income (FDI) 0.85 0.83 1          
Lower middle income (FDI) 0.87 0.84 0.92 1         
Low income (FDI) 0.78 0.75 0.92 0.95 1        
China (FDI) 0.48 0.44 0.65 0.81 0.79 1       
World (NFDI) 0.91 0.89 0.89 0.95 0.91 0.69 1      
High income (NFDI) 0.91 0.89 0.89 0.94 0.91 0.67 1.00 1     
Upper middle income (NFDI) -0.33 -0.32 -0.26 -0.35 -0.40 -0.24 -0.27 -0.30 1    
Lower middle income (NFDI) 0.80 0.77 0.84 0.94 0.88 0.82 0.90 0.89 -0.31 1   
Low income (NFDI) 0.39 0.36 0.53 0.63 0.70 0.77 0.57 0.57 -0.41 0.65 1  
China (NFDI) 0.81 0.80 0.70 0.78 0.70 0.47 0.89 0.89 -0.24 0.85 0.33 1 
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Figure 1. Gross Private Capital Flows of FDI from 1977 to 2003 
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Figure 2. Gross Private Capital Flow of Non-FDI from 1977 to 2003 
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As for NFDI, gross flows have risen from less than 1 percent in the early 1980s to over 8 
percent two decades later. The dip in China’s NFDI in 2001 and 2002 seems to be 
synchronized with the world trend and that of high income countries. We suspect this was 
related to a series of events that simultaneously affected global financial markets, including 
the busting of the technology bubble in 2000, the September 11 event, the collapse of a 
number of large corporations in the US and other OECD countries and the wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. It is interesting to note that China’s NFDI is particularly highly 
correlated with high income countries. Despite this impressive correlation, in contrast to the 
level of FDI, the gap between the level of China’s NDFI and the high income country 
average has been widening from around 5 percent of GDP in the 1980s to 9 percent in the 
1990s and to over 11 percent in the early 2000s.  
 
A word of caution is in order here. The sizeable unofficial capital flows alluded to in section 
one imply that Figure 2 will understate actual (official plus unofficial) NFDI in the case of 
China. One common way of estimating actual NFDI, in net terms, is to make use of national 
income accounting relationships. Changes in foreign reserve holdings should be attributable 
to either the current account balance and / or net capital flows. As changes in foreign 
reserves, the current account balance and net FDI are deemed more easily accounted for than 
NFDI flows, actual net NFDI can then be estimated as a residual3 (Row 5, Table 2). Actual 
net NFDI can then be broken down into its official and unofficial components. Unofficial 
NFDI will be equal to actual net NFDI minus official net NFDI, the latter of which can be 
calculated as the difference between total net private capital flows and net FDI flows (Row 8, 
Table 2). The estimated data relating to unofficial net NFDI seems plausible. For most of the 
                                                 
3 While being a reasonable assertion, there are clearly problems that also occur in accurately measuring the 
current account surplus (e.g., the mis-invoicing of exports and imports) and the level of FDI (e.g., “round trip” 
capital of Chinese origin and NFDI entering the country in the guise of FDI in order to take advantage of the 
favourable policies extended to FDI) (Xiao 2004; Prasad and Wei 2005).  
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period, unofficial capital outflows exceeded unofficial inflows. This was particularly the case 
during the period of the Asian financial crisis when there were expectations of China 
devaluing the RMB. Since 2001 however this trend slowed and by 2003 when expectations of 
an impending RMB appreciation had reached fever-pitched levels, unofficial inflows 
exceeded outflows. Nonetheless, there is one problem associated with these estimates of 
unofficial NFDI – they are in net rather than in gross terms. We do not see this as a major 
weakness though. This is because, particularly in the context of developing countries, 
unofficial NFDI flows during a certain time period tend to be dominated by movements in 
one direction or another. For example, during the Asian financial crisis, few would argue 
with the contention that unofficial NFDI overwhelmingly moved abroad. Similarly, in 2003 
unofficial NFDI was overwhelmingly moving into China. What this means is that the 
absolute value of the net figure represents a lower bound approximately equal to the real  
gross figure. As a result, if we add the absolute value of net unofficial NFDI to gross official 
NFDI, we conclude that actual gross NFDI for China has been averaging around 9.9 percent 
of GDP over the period of 1996-2003 (Row 12, Table 2). This figure exceeds the upper 
middle-income country group average over this period (9.2 percent) although it remains 
considerably short of the world average (16.7 percent) and certainly below the average of 
high-income countries (18.7 percent).  
 
In summary, China’s capital flows already show a connection with global financial markets 
in terms of correlation. A noticeable difference between FDI and NDFI however is that while 
the level of FDI has approached the world average, the level of NFDI has yet to keep up. This 
is consistent with what we know about the differential pace at which liberalization has 
preceded with respect to FDI on the one hand and NFDI on the other. As a consequence, the 
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Table 2. China’s Capital Flows, 1996 – 2004 
 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Total reserves, inc. 
gold ($US billion) 108 143 150 158 169 219 295 457 
1 619 
Total reserve 
accumulation, inc. gold 
($US billion) 
32 36 6 9 11 50 77 162 207 
Current account 
surplus ($US billion) 7 37 31 21 21 17 35 46 70 
Net FDI ($US billion) 2 38 42 41 37 37 37 47 47 61 
Actual net NFDI ($US 
billion) -13 -43 -66 -49 -47 -4 -5 69 77 
Total official net 
private capital flows 
($US billion)  
49 58 42 37 41 41 47 60  
Official net NFDI ($US 
billion) 11 16 1 -1 4 4 0 13  
Unofficial net NFDI 
($US billion) -24 -59 -67 -48 -51 -8 -5 56  
GDP 821 903 954 999 1079 1176 1271 1412 1593 
Official gross NFDI (%  
GDP) 1.4 5.8 5.9 8.0 8.3 5.4 3.3 9.8  
Unofficial net NFDI (% 
GDP) -2.9 -6.5 -7.0 -4.8 -4.7 -0.7 -0.4 4.0  
Total actual = official 
gross NFDI plus 
absolute unofficial net 
NFDI (% GDP) 
4.3 12.3 12.9 12.8 13.0 6.1 3.7 13.8  
Source – International Monetary Fund 
Notes – 
1. In 2003 the Chinese government used $US45 billion from its foreign reserves to recapitalise two state banks. 
As a result, the 2003 figure for total reserves is the official value plus $US 45 billion. The 2004 figure is simply 
the official estimate.  
2. The FDI figure for 2004 it is not a net figure. It is simply inward FDI. The source is the National Bureau of 
Statistics. In previous years, outward FDI recorded in the national accounts has been very small. 
 
real issue and challenge in determining the current degree of capital account convertibility in 
China lies in finding out what gross NFDI flows would be were there no capital controls in 
place. The next section explains the econometric model and data we use in an attempt to shed 
light on this question.  
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3. The Model and Data 
In the last section, it was shown that even after adjusting for unofficial flows, the level of 
China’s gross NFDI flows continues to lag behind that of the world average by a significant 
margin. Nonetheless, without controlling for other potentially relevant factors, this gap may 
not accurately reflect on the degree of capital account convertibility. To address this issue, we 
use data from countries with open capital accounts to estimate an econometric model that can 
satisfactorily explain NFDI flows in terms of a number of explanatory variables. Based on the 
observed values of these explanatory variables in the case of China, we then use this model to 
estimate a predicted or expected value for its NFDI were its capital account open. The ratio of 
this predicted value to the observed value of China’s NFDI can then be used as a guide to the 
current degree of capital account convertibility. 
 
Comparing a predicted value with an observed value is a commonly used technique to gauge 
the extent of market distortions and it is a method that has previously been used in the 
Chinese context. Chang and Shao (2004), for example, used it to make inferences regarding 
the extent to which the fixed RMB/$US exchange rate deviated from the equilibrium value. 
Earlier, Wei (1995) estimated an FDI model and compared the expected value implied by this 
model with the observed volume of FDI going into China during the 1980s. Given that FDI 
flows were substantially liberalised during the 1990s, the real appeal now lies in applying this 
technique to NFDI data. There are other methods that can be used to determine the openness 
of the Chinese economy to international trade and investment flows. Cheung, Chinn and Fujii 
(2003) for example based their analysis on the international parity conditions. The logic here 
is that if countries have open capital accounts, then after making an appropriate allowance for 
expected exchange rate fluctuations, arbitrage should lead to synchronous movements in 
interest rates between them. Each method has advantages and disadvantages. A merit of the 
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technique we use is that it allows some quantitative assessment to be made regarding the 
degree of capital account convertibility. Capital accounts are not simply open or closed, 
certainly not in a de facto sense, and it is the degree of capital account convertibility that is 
important for policy-making.  It does however need to be acknowledged that there are 
weaknesses with this approach. Most notably, the point estimate of any forecasting model 
will be subject to a standard error. This necessarily qualifies the confidence that can be placed 
in the point estimate, at least in a statistical sense. But such costs have to be balanced against 
those associated with using alternative techniques. Studies based on the international parity 
conditions generally offer limited insight into the degree of capital account convertibility and 
any results must also be qualified due to the fact that a representative, internationally 
comparable and market determined interest rate must be selected, which is not an easy task in 
view of China’s fragmented and regulated financial markets. Restrictive assumptions must 
also be made regarding how exchange rate expectations are formed. The technique used in 
this paper holds certain advantages and ideally it would be complemented in the future by 
other research that draws on alternative methodologies.   
 
The Model 
The regression model estimated is a cross section model of the following general form: 
 '0i i iNFDI α ε= + +1x α  (1) 
where i is a country index, ix  a vector of explanatory variables, and iε  an i.i.d. error term; 
and NFDI  is measured in the percentage of GDP.  
 
The initial, general vector ix , which is later tested down to include a smaller subset of 
explanatory variables, includes:  
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- GDP (PPP, international currency): The inclusion of GDP is to examine if there is any 
size effect as NFDI is already expressed in percentage of GDP. 
- GDP per capita (PPP, international currency): A richer country entails, as well as 
provides, more investment opportunities. 
- Growth rate of GDP per capita: A faster growing country would expectedly attract 
more foreign capital.4 
- Trade (percent GDP): Countries that are open to trade in goods and services also tend 
to be open to trade in capital, most obviously in trade-related finance. 
- FDI (percent GDP): Dasgupta and Ratha (2000) show that FDI flows to developing 
countries are strongly associated with NFDI flows. This is not surprising given many 
driving factors of FDI and NFDI are in common, such as investment environments, 
market potential, etc.  
- GOV: A governance index is included to capture the effects of the institutional 
environment on capital flows. We constructed this index using the principal 
components method. The underlying data series are from the World Bank, which 
every two years since 1996 has collected an extensive international data set on six 
aspects of governance include Voice and Accountability, Political Instability and 
Violence, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and Control of 
Corruption (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2005). As expected, data pertaining to 
the six aspects of governance are positively and highly correlated with one another to 
the extent that the first principal component extracted accounts for around 85 percent 
of the variance in the six underlying series. As a result, the first principal component 
is sufficient to construct our overall GOV index.  
                                                 
4 The growth rate of GDP has also been tested but it did not alter the result. 
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- Gross national saving rate and current account balance. These two variables are 
intended to capture a country’s need to borrow from, or its ability to lend to, global 
financial markets. 
- The squared terms of the explanatory variables are also included to allow for non-
linearity. For instance, a fast growing economy will attract foreign capital inflows and 
therefore have a large gross capital flow figure. On the other hand, an economy that 
has a negative growth rate may experience large capital outflows and therefore also 
have a large gross capital flow figure. 
 
Data 
In view of the year-to-year volatility in NFDI, we use the three year average value over 2001-
2003. For all variables in ix , except GOV, the average values over 1998-2000 are used to 
mitigate year-to-year volatility and potential endogeneity problems with NFDI. As for GOV, 
data for 2002 are used as those for 2001 and 2003 are not available. Furthermore, the 
theoretical causality clearly runs in the direction of from GOV to NFDI and not vice versa; so 
endogeneity should not be a problem. Unless otherwise stated, the data are drawn from the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators database. 
 
We estimate the above model using data from countries that have open capital accounts. To 
select these countries, we make use of the qualitative data that has been published annually 
by the IMF on each of its member countries (IMF various years). This source states whether 
capital controls exist across 13 different types of capital account transactions (e.g., 
transactions involving capital market securities, commercial credits, real estate transactions, 
personal capital movements, etc). If a country has no controls on at least 7 out of the 13 
different capital account transaction types over the 2001-2003 period then we deem its capital 
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account to be open. In total, 66 out of 188 countries classified by the IMF satisfied this 
selection criterion. However, of these 66 countries, 13 of them do not have data on capital 
flows. Of the 53 that do, 10 are classified as offshore financial centres (OFCs) by the Bank 
for International Settlements (BIS). These include, amongst others, Bahrain, Panama, and 
Hong Kong.5 The average size of NFDI for this OFC group is 110 percent of GDP, compared 
to 17 percent for the remaining 43 countries. Econometric estimation results also indicate that 
the OFC countries behave very differently from non-OFC countries.6 (The results are 
reported in the Referee Appendix A at the end of the paper.) Considering that even if its 
capital account did become fully convertible, China is unlikely to become an OFC in the 
foreseeable future, we decide to focus on a sample that excludes the OFCs. We label this 43 
country sample ‘the base sample’. Given that this sample size in not particularly large, we 
later modify the sample to examine how sensitive the results are with respect to the sample 
size. 
 
Table 3 lists the base sample of countries plus China, and ranks them according to NFDI. The 
criterion of a 'simple majority' of 7 out of 13 is no doubt a somewhat arbitrary way of 
deciding which countries have an open capital account. While there may be little difference 
between a country that has controls on 6 types of capital controls versus another that has 
controls on 7, the vast majority of countries either accepted or rejected do not fall into this 
grey area. A cursory glance down the list of countries in Table 3 suggests that the countries 
selected are generally perceived as financially open. The above criterion is also made in order 
to strike a balance between ensuring the selected countries have a sufficient degree of  
                                                 
5 Belgium is not classified by BIS as an OFC, but its close neighbour Luxemburg is. However, the IMF BoP 
database does not have separate entry for Luxemburg except for the last few years. We suspect the data for 
Belgium is highly affected by its close ties with Luxemburg. In fact, Belgium has the second largest value for 
NFDI in the sample. Therefore, we treat Belgium as an OFC and exclude it from the sample. 
6 Econometric estimation results indicate that an OFC dummy variable and its interaction terms with other 
variables are significant at standard significance levels. The result can be obtained from the authors on request. 
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Table 3. Selected Data for the Sample Countries plus China (ranking is based on NFDI) 
Rank Country Income a  NFDI FDI GOV 
1 Netherlands OECD 60.9 27.1 3.8 
2 Uruguay UMI 51.0 1.1 1.5 
3 United Kingdom OECD 50.9 25.6 3.3 
4 Portugal OECD 38.6 26.2 2.7 
5 Finland OECD 34.3 26.1 4.1 
6 Austria OECD 32.5 4.7 3.3 
7 Norway OECD 24.4 9.0 3.6 
8 Spain OECD 24.2 10.8 2.6 
9 Jamaica LMI 24.1 6.9 0.0 
10 Denmark OECD 24.0 22.3 3.8 
11 Sweden OECD 24.0 24.8 3.7 
12 Estonia UMI 21.7 9.7 2.1 
13 Latvia UMI 21.1 5.8 1.4 
14 Greece OECD 20.1 1.3 1.8 
15 Bosnia and Herzegovina LMI 19.8 2.8 -1.4 
16 Germany OECD 19.7 9.7 3.2 
17 Hungary UMI 16.6 7.6 2.0 
18 Chile UMI 16.2 12.3 2.6 
19 Guatemala LMI 15.9 9.9 -1.0 
20 France OECD 15.6 11.1 2.6 
21 Czech Republic UMI 13.9 8.9 1.7 
22 El Salvador LMI 13.8 4.2 -0.3 
23 Japan OECD 13.7 0.9 2.3 
24 Italy OECD 13.3 1.6 2.0 
25 Jordan LMI 11.9 5.1 0.0 
26 Ecuador LMI 11.0 4.0 -1.4 
27 Lithuania UMI 9.7 5.9 1.6 
28 Canada OECD 9.4 11.3 3.5 
29 Trinidad and Tobago UMI 9.3 11.5 0.7 
30 Israel HI: nonOECD 8.5 4.7 1.0 
31 Botswana UMI 8.4 1.6 1.7 
32 United States OECD 8.1 5.4 2.7 
33 Bolivia LMI 7.8 10.7 -0.7 
34 Armenia LMI 7.6 7.9 -0.8 
35 Paraguay LMI 7.4 2.6 -1.9 
36 China LMI 6.2 4.7 -0.8 
37 Kenya LI 5.6 0.4 -1.6 
38 Peru LMI 5.0 3.4 -0.4 
39 New Zealand OECD 5.0 11.8 3.7 
40 Guyana LMI 4.4 7.4 -0.4 
41 Nicaragua LI 3.2 7.3 -0.7 
42 Oman UMI 3.0 0.4 1.2 
43 Uganda LI 1.9 2.8 -1.4 
44 Yemen, Rep. LI 1.3 2.8 -1.8 
 
(a) HI: high income; UMI: upper middle income; LMI: lower middle income; LI: low income. 
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openness to allow the forecasting model to generate a meaningful estimate while at the same 
time also permitting sufficient diversity in terms of the explanatory variables. Later, we will 
examine the sensitivity of the results with respect to a change in the selection criterion. 
 
Expectedly, the base sample has more high income countries than low and middle income 
countries (although these country groups are still represented) as the former group is typically 
more integrated with global financial markets. As we have seen in Figure 2, China’s NFDI is 
highly correlated with that of high income countries. Therefore, the preponderance of high 
income countries in the full sample would in fact be a merit rather than a problem. 
 
Table 3 provides the data for two explanatory variables, FDI and GOV. We only include 
these two variables here because, as will be shown in the next section, they turn out to be the 
only two that play a statistically significant role in terms of explaining NFDI flows.  
 
4. Results 
Estimation Model 
The results for our preferred model are reported in the “Estimation model – Base sample” 
column in Table 4. It can be noted from the table that many of the explanatory variables 
comprising the vector ix  do not feature in the model due to statistical insignificance. 
Nevertheless, this parsimonious model yields an adjusted R2 close to 0.5, which is not a small 
number for a cross section model that seeks to explain capital flows. 
 
FDI and its squared terms are significant at 10 percent and 1 percent level respectively. This 
result supports the argument that there are common elements that motivate both FDI and 
NFDI. But it also suggests the relationship between the two is non-linear and, therefore, 
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cannot be described simply as the one of substitutes or complements. GOV is the only other 
variable that is significant at the standard 5 percent confidence level. The coefficient indicates 
that a one point increase in a country’s governance performance as graded by the GOV index 
will raise NFDI flows by 2.24 percentage points. Within the base sample the standard 
derivation of GOV is equal to 1.81, suggesting that an increase of the index by one point is 
very feasible. This result highlights the fact that governance is a significant determinant of 
NFDI flows not only in statistical sense but also in economic sense. 
 
Table 4. Estimation Results 
 
 Estimation model Predication model 
 Base sample Base sample Sample A Sample B Sample C
Constant 
( CHNNFDI ) 
15.710*** 
(3.481) 
9.371*** 
(2.236) 
9.043*** 
(2.337) 
9.737*** 
(1.915) 
9.862*** 
(1.600) 
FDI  -1.344* (0.734) 
-1.344* 
(0.734) 
-1.596** 
(0.766) 
-1.395** 
(0.696) 
-1.228** 
(0.572) 
2FDI  
0.077*** 
(0.025) 
0.077*** 
(0.025) 
0.090*** 
(0.027) 
0.078*** 
(0.024) 
0.076*** 
(0.021) 
GOV  2.242** (0.988) 
2.242** 
(0.988) 
2.318** 
(1.000) 
2.270*** 
(0.894) 
2.649*** 
(0.614) 
* iD FDI     
 0.523** 
(0.230) 
R2 0.530 0.530 0.577 0.521 0.526 
Adjusted R2 0.493 0.493 0.541 0.489 0.503 
S.E. of regression 9.680 9.680 9.542 9.486 9.720 
S.E. of CHNNFDI   9.935 9.824 9.677 9.851 
No. of observation 43 43 39 48 87 
      
Predicted value / 
observed value 
 0.84 0.87 0.81 0.80 
 
Figures in the brackets are standard errors. ***, ** and * denote significant at 1, 5 and 10 percent 
levels respectively. “D” is a dummy for the period 2000-2002. 
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Prediction Model 
Based on the result in Table 4, the preferred model is 
 
? 2
0 1 2 3ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆi i i iNFDI FDI FDI GOVα α α α= + + +  (2) 
where ? iNFDI  is the expected value of iNFDI  given the particular values for the explanatory 
variables, and the values of the estimated coefficient, ˆ 'j sα , are given in the table. 
 
If we insert the observed value of FDI (2001-2003 average) and GOV (2002) for China into 
(2), we obtain 
 
? 2
0 1 2 3ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆCHN CHN CHN CHNNFDI FDI FDI GOVα α α α= + + +  (3) 
where the subscript “CHN” denotes China and ?CHNNFDI  is the predicted value of CHNNFDI . 
A drawback of obtaining the predicted value of CHNNFDI  in this way is that it does not 
provide us with any information on the standard error of the point estimate. This problem can 
be circumvented by subtracting (3) from (2): 
 
? ? 2 2
1 2
3
ˆ ˆ( ) ( )
ˆ ( )
i CHN i CHN i CHN
i CHN
NFDI NFCI FDI FDI FDI FDI
GOV GOV
α α
α
= + − + −
+ −  (4) 
This implies that, if we run the following regression: 
 
2 2
0 1 2
3
( ) ( )
( )
i i CHN i CHN
i CHN i
NFDI FDI FDI FDI FDI
GOV GOV e
β α α
α
= + − + −
+ − +  (5) 
where ie  is an error term, the predicted value of CHNNFDI  will be given by the estimated 
constant term, 0β . The standard error of the prediction will be equal to 2 2 1/ 2ˆ ˆ( )ρ σ+ , where 
2ρ  is the variance of the of 0β  and 2σ  the variance of the error in the population 
(Wooldridge 2000: p.200). It should be noted that, except the constant term, the estimated 
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coefficients for the prediction model (5) are exactly the same as those of the estimation model 
(2). 
 
The result of the above prediction model is reported in the “Prediction model – Base sample” 
column of Table 4. The predicted value of CHNNFDI  is equal to 9.37. The standard error of 
the predicted value is rather large at 9.94. A standard error of this magnitude is not 
uncommon in forecasting models with the reason lying in the large value of 2σˆ . Since 2σ  
comes from the error in the population, it does not change even with a much larger sample 
size.7 The other error component, 2ρ , indeed is very small. Nonetheless, given the standard 
error in the prediction, it is warranted to examine its robustness in other ways. To this end, we 
estimate three other samples: A, B and C. The prediction results based on these other samples 
are also reported in Table 4. 
 
Sensitivity Tests 
Sample A is a sub-set of the base sample with a more restrictive selection criterion. To be 
qualified to enter this sample, countries must have no controls on at least 8 capital account 
transaction types (as opposed to 7 in the base sample). This reduces the sample size to 39. 
The predicted value for CHNNFDI  remains in the vicinity of the original estimate, reducing 
only slightly to 9.0. Other coefficients also change only marginally. Sample B, on the other 
hand, represents a loosening of the selection criterion to 6 transaction types. This increases 
the sample size to 48. Again, the prediction value for CHNNFDI  as well as other coefficients 
change only marginally. 
                                                 
7 Increase the sample size, however, will reduce the size of 2ρˆ . Nonetheless, since 2ρˆ  is already quite small 
compared to 2σˆ in our case and so further reducing it will not make any material difference to the prediction 
error. 
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If one wants to further expand the sample size, one way to do so would be to further loosen 
the selection criterion. We are reluctant to take this path because if the sample consists 
increasingly of countries with not particularly open capital accounts, the predicted value will 
be rendered meaningless. Instead, what we can do is to expand the sample size by extending 
the observation period. In the base sample, the value of NFDI is a three year average over 
2001-2003. We extend the number of observations by including another set of three-year 
average values for NFDI over 2000-2002. The values for the explanatory variables are 
extended accordingly. The two sets of data are then combined together to form a pooled 
dataset of twice the size of the base sample.8 We label this ‘sample C’.  
 
The result for sample C is reported in the last column of Table 4. Sample C has one more 
explanatory variable, *D FDI , where D is a dummy for the second period. The significance 
of the dummy indicates that the equilibrium value of NFDI as captured by the explanatory 
variables varies over time. This is not surprising as we can see from Figures 1 and 2 that both 
NFDI and FDI have evolved rapidly in recent years. On the other hand, the interaction term 
*D GOV  is not significant at standard levels and therefore dropped. This is also to be 
expected because institutional environments tend to change only very gradually. 
Nevertheless, the finding does carry the implication that unless one has a model that can 
captures the time series dynamics of NFDI, using dated data to predict the current value 
of CHNNFDI  could be misleading.
9 Notwithstanding, it can be seen from Table 4 that the 
prediction and other coefficients continue to remain similar to those of the base sample. 
                                                 
8 The size of this sample is more than twice that of the base sample by one observation because during the 
period 2000-2002, one more country meets the selection criterion. 
9 We have tried extending the time period back one more year to cover 1999-2001 and found that, once again, 
the interaction terms between the period dummies and FDI are significant. This further confirms that the 
equilibrium value of NFDI is time-varying. The results are available on request. (The result is reported in 
Referee Appendix B at the end of the paper.) 
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The results of estimations based on the three different sample suggest that the predicted value 
for CHNNFDI  is fairly robust with respect to the sample selection criterion and sample size. 
Overall, the sensitivity test results have boosted our confidence in the base sample findings, 
even in the presence of a relatively large (and unavoidable) standard error associated with the 
point estimate.  
 
Capital Account Openness 
According to the base sample, the predicted value of CHNNFDI  is equal to 9.4. The observed 
value of CHNNFDI  over 2001-2003 is 6.2 (Row 10, Table 2). If we add the absolute value of 
the unofficial net NFDI flows estimated in section 2 (Row 11, Table 2) and recall that the 
absolute value of the net figure provides a minimum value for the gross figure, then actual 
NFDI averages at least 7.9 percent of GDP over 2001-2003 (Row 12, Table 2). Thus, the 
result implies that the actual observed value of NFDI in recent years has been about 85 
percent that of which could be expected if China had an open capital account (last row, Table 
4).  The predicted values obtained from the alternative samples suggest a value plus or minus 
5 percentage points around this figure. China’s capital account, it appears, already displays a 
high degree of de facto convertibility. 
 
This conclusion warrants explanation. The most obvious causal factor lies simply in China’s 
growing integration with the rest of the world, particularly in terms of trade flows. According 
to WTO statistics, China’s share of world merchandise trade had jumped to 6 percent in 2003 
- up from 2.7 percent in 1995. This figure exceeded the share of other prominent trading 
nations such as Japan (5.8 percent) and followed only Germany (9.1 percent) and the U.S 
(17.2 percent). FDI inflows have strongly contributed to this export performance with foreign 
22 
invested enterprises accounting for 57 percent of China’s total exports in 2004. Since NFDI 
sometimes goes hand in hand with trade flows (e.g., trade credits), more trade generally 
increases the scope for placing mis-invoices, which is one of the most common means to 
circumvent official capital controls. As a result, it is not surprising that despite the de jure 
regime of China’s capital account remaining relatively closed, the de facto regime has 
become far more open. In this aspect, WTO entry in 2001 provided a further shot in the arm 
to China’s integration with global financial markets.  
 
Another factor that is no doubt prominent in explaining the high degree of capital account 
convertibility is the mainland’s geographical, economic and social connection with Hong 
Kong SAR, which is a well established international financial center and is regarded as one of 
the most open economies. There has always been a porous border between the mainland and 
Hong Kong, particularly as Hong Kong serves as an entrepôt of both merchandise trade and 
capital for the mainland. This close economic tie has created conduits for capital to move in 
and out of China at a larger volume than the de jure regime would imply.  
 
5. Conclusions and Policy implications 
In interpreting our findings and drawing policy implications, it is important to note that the 
predicted value generated by the model and the actual observed value are derived from 
annual data. Thus, while our results suggest a high degree of capital account openness, they 
do refer to a one-year time horizon and do not comment specifically on the degree of short 
run convertibility. It is to be expected though that convertibility in the short run would be less 
than in the medium or long run. That is, despite the fact that unofficial channels for moving 
capital across the border clearly exist in China, one would not expect the volume of funds 
that could feasibly be moved in a matter of hours or days to be in the same vicinity as those 
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countries that have de jure open capital accounts. What the results suggest is that over a one 
year time horizon, with many short run fluctuations in capital movements being averaged out, 
the demand for moving capital in or out of China is already largely being met through official 
and unofficial means. This is an interesting finding because it means that a lower level of 
convertibility in the short run is not necessarily incompatible with higher degrees of 
convertibility in the longer term. It also has policy implications. Events such as the Asian 
financial crisis show that large, short-term capital movements can be devastating to an 
economy. On the other hand, a lesson that can be drawn from non-crisis periods is that 
integration into global financial markets is as an important step to ensure the efficient use of 
savings and to maximize investment opportunities. How to balance the cost of reversals in 
short term capital flows against the benefits of higher allocative efficiency from international 
connectedness becomes a key issue. The finding of this paper is that over a one-year time 
horizon, China’s de facto capital account regime for NFDI is already about 85 percent open, 
implying that any distortion in allocative efficiency over the medium and long term has only 
been modest. If it is accepted that short run convertibility would be less than this figure, then 
it can also be concluded that the economy has to some extent been spared the potentially 
destabilizing effects of unwanted capital movements. Unfortunately, data limitations do not 
allow us to compute more detailed estimates of short run convertibility, which would allow a 
more accurate assessment of these issues to be made. Differences between short run and 
longer-run convertibility also go some way to explaining how the Chinese authorities have 
been able to achieve macroeconomic stability and a fixed exchange rate on the one hand and 
be increasingly open to international trade and investment flows on the other.  
 
The results do not leave room for complacency in policy efforts though. The time period 
covered by the empirical analysis was 2001-2003. This period does not cover the introduction 
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of several recent policies that would be expected to impact on capital account convertibility. 
For example, while China joined the WTO in 2001 many of the commitments made are being 
implemented in staggered fashion. In the financial sector the full liberalization package is not 
due to be completed until 2006.  Other initiatives such as the Closer Economic Partnership 
Arrangement between Hong Kong and the mainland, which began to take effect on January 
1st 2004, offers Hong Kong firms numerous WTO-plus concessions with respect to their 
mainland dealings, as well as expanding the flow of tourists from the mainland into Hong 
Kong (and the capital they bring). Banks based in Hong Kong have been given permission to 
conduct RMB business for individuals covering areas such as deposits, remittances and 
exchange business. These types of liberalization measures mean that it can safely be 
concluded that overall convertibility, and particularly short-run convertibility, is on the rise. 
Our results suggest that the main impact of future liberalization will not so much be greater 
overall volumes of capital entering and leaving China on an annual basis but rather the 
volatility with which they do so on a shorter time horizon. This in turn implies a sense of 
urgency is needed with respect to adopting reforms that may be regarded as essential 
prerequisites for full capital account convertibility such as domestic financial liberalization 
and a best practice prudential framework for the financial sector. These tasks are much easier 
listed than enacted. Introducing interest rate liberalization, for example, is difficult in the 
absence of well-developed direct capital markets and when the major banks and their primary 
borrower group, the state-owned enterprises, continue to exhibit soft budget constraints. 
Current reforms, such as inviting foreign banks to take equity stakes in Chinese lenders and 
recapitalizing and publicly listing the big four state banks, are steps in the right direction but 
much more needs to be done. The case for introducing other policies, such as abandoning the 
pegged exchange rate is less clear cut. Mundell (2003), for example, argues that claims of 
highly mobile capital flows being the death of fixed exchange rates misses the key point. The 
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key issue is credibility. If the fixed rate is credible, then volatile and unwanted speculative 
capital flows will in fact be discouraged. Juxtaposed against countries such as Thailand 
during the Asian financial crisis, China’s huge stock stockpile of foreign exchange reserves, 
moderate current account surpluses and current macroeconomic stability all point to 
credibility remaining high. One thing for certain is that the changing degree of capital 
account convertibility will be driving much of China’s economic policy into the foreseeable 
future.  
References 
 
Chai, J. C. H. (1998). China: Transition to a Market Economy. Oxford, Clarendon Press. 
Chang, G. and Q. Shao (2004). "How much is the Chinese currency undervalued? A 
quantitative estimation." China Economic Review 15(3): 366-371. 
Cheung, Y.-W., M. D. Chinn and E. Fujii (2003). "China, Hong Kong and Taiwan: A 
quantitative assessment of real and financial integration." China Economic Review 
14(3): 281-303. 
Dasgupta, D. and D. Ratha (2000). "What Factors Appear to Derive Private Capital Flows to 
Developing Countries And How Does Official Lending Responds?" World Bank 
Policy Research Working Paper No. 2392. 
Eichengreen, B. (2004). "Chinese currency controversies." CEPR Discussion Paper #4375. 
Goldstein, M. and N. Lardy (2003). "Two-stage currency reform for China". Asian Wall 
Street Journal. 
IMF (various years). Annual report on exchange arrangements and exchange restrictions. 
Washington. 
Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi (2005). "Governance Matters IV: Governance 
Indicators for 1996-2004." World Bank Working Paper. 
Laurenceson, J. and J. C. H. Chai (2003). Financial reform and economic development in 
China. Cheltenham, Edward Elgar. 
Mundell, R. (2003). "Prospects for an Asian currency area." Journal of Asian Economics 
14(1): 1-10. 
Prasad, E. and S. Wei (2005). "The Chinese approach to capital inflows: Patterns and 
possible explanations." IMF Working Paper WP/05/79. 
Roberst, I. and R. Tyers (2003). "China's exchange rate policy: The case for greater 
flexibility." Asian Economic Journal 17(2): 155-184. 
Wei, S. (1995). "Attracting foreign direct investment: Has China reached its potentials?" 
China Economic Review 6(2): 187-199. 
Wooldridge, J. M. (2000). Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach, South-Western 
College Publishing. 
Wu, F. and L. Tang (2000). "China's capital flight, 1990-1999: Estimates and implications." 
Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies 3(1): 59-75. 
Xiao, G. (2004). "People's Republic of China's round-tripping FDI: Scale, causes and 
implications." ADB Institute Discussion Paper #7. 
26 
Yu, Y. (2000). China: The case for capital controls. Global finance: new thinking on 
regulating speculative capital markets. W. Bello, N. Bullard and K. Malhotra. 
London, Zed Books: 177-187. 
 
